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PlaintilIs also complain that lithe closing 
of Vaughn Street requires trucks servicing 
the property of plaintiffs, and other indus-
tdes along Vaughn Street, to use Bradley 
Avenue, to Paxton Street; said Bradley 
Avenue is a narrow, residential street and 
the ·use of the same by heavy trucks is dan~ 
gCTOUS and adverse to the best interests of 
the public using the-' same; if said Vaughn 
Street crossing is permitted to remain ob-
structed and dosed, the 'access to the prop-
erty of said plaintiffs by fire, police and 
other public services, in the event of emerg-
encies, will be greatly' impaired and de-
layed," 
[13,14] The first of these contentions 
relat,es to matters already considered fully 
by the Public _Utilities Commission (In re 
G. C. Breidert, Decision ,No. 61775, supra, 
58 Cal.P.U.C. 624 (unreported)), and in any 
event injury to the public does not establish 
a compensable loss to a private landowner 
unless he is thereby specially injured. (E.g., 
Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry., supra, 103 
Cal. 614, 37 P. 750.) Tho. second contention 
refers to' matters too speculative to produce 
a compensable 10ss.8 (See "Rose v. State of 
California, supra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 738. 123 P. 
2d 50S.) 
At a time when the tremendous growth of 
population ,of this state compels rerouting 
and rearrangement of streets and highways, 
the claimed damages to property owners 
from loss of access to the next intersecting 
street and to the general system of streets 
must be more than formal. It must be a true 
loss; it must be substantial. -
entirely destroyed and yet n9t diminish 
the actual value of the property for its 
1lighest and best usc." (See HoUowny v. 
Pureell (1950) 3,'l CaI.2d 220. 230. 217 
P.2d 005; People v. Sayig (1951) 101 
Cal.App.2d 890. 226 P.2d 702; City of 
Los Angeles v. Geiger (1949) 94 CaL 
App.2d 180. 191. 210 P.2d 717; Wolff 
v. City of Los Angeles (1920) 49 Cal. 
App. 400. 402. 193 P. 862; Oakland v. 
Pacific Coast Lumber etc. Co. (1915) 
171 Cal. 392, 399, 153 P. 705.) 
The judgments are reversed with instrue-
tions to overrule the general demurrers and 
to permit the parties to proceed in a manner 
consistent with this opinion. 
GIBSON, C. J., and SCHAUER, Mc-
COMB, PETERS and PEEK, JJ., concur. 
TRAYNOR, Justice (concurring). 
Although I adhere to the views set forth 
in my dissenting opinion in Bacich v. Board 
of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 366-380, 144 P.2d 
818, that case is the law of this state until it 
is overruled. I therefore concur in the 
judgment herein under the compulsion of 
the Bacich case. 
o !~""";;;".::':;:""n::C' .. = 
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Ronald J. VALENTA.t al., Plalntl1ra 
and Appellants, 
Y. 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES .t aI., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
L. A. 27655. 
Supreme Court of California. 
In Bank. 
Aug. 20. 19M. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 18. 1964. 
Action for damage to plaintiffs' prop-
erty resulting from the closing of access to 
a highway. The Superior Court, Los Ange-
les County, Macklin Fleming and Leon T. 
David, JJ., sustained defendants' general 
8. "Plnintiffs also claim damages for the 
taking of an easement over the Vaughn 
Street crossing and _ for maintenance of 
n nuisnnce. PlaintUfs have no property 
right in the public crossings (see City 
of San Mateo v. Railroad Com. (1937) 9 
Ca1.2d 1. 68 P.2d 713) and plaintiJfs 
state no calise of action for mnintennnce 
Q~ a nuisance unless they show that they 
have been specially injured (see Bigley 
v. Nunan (1879) 53 C~"t1. 403). 
~---------------.~-----------,-'--------------
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demurrer to plaintiffs' amended complaint, 
and entered judgments of dismissal, and 
plaintiffs appealed. . The Supreme Court, 
T obriner, J.r held that plaintiffs were not 
entitled to damages for the taking of their 
right of access to a highway even if it 
resulted in their property having- been 
placed on a cul-de-sac, in absence of a 
showing of a substantial impairment of 
access to the general system of public 
streets or highways, but. under the circum-
stances, plaintiffs were entitled to a further 
opportunity to amend their complaint if they 
could do so, to state a cause of action for 
substantial impairment of access, 
Judgments reversed. 
Opinion, 34 Cal.Rptr. 155, vacated. 
I. Highways e=>B5 
Owners of land in an unincorporated 
area possessed the same right of access to 
public streets and highways as those of 
urhan landowners. 
2. Eminent Domain ¢;:)85 
Plaintiffs were not entitled to damages 
for the taking of their right of ,access to a 
highway even if it resulted in their prop-
erty having been placed on a cul-de-sac, in 
absence of a showing of a substantial im-
pairment of access to the general system of 
public streets or highways. 
3. Eminent Domain ¢::::3106 
In order for an abutting owner to state 
a cause of action for damage to his prop-
erty through loss of access to public streets 
or public highways he must make a show-
ing of substantial impairment of access, and 
a bare showing that property has been 
placed on a cul-de-sac is not sufficient. 
Anson, Gleaves & Larson and Milnor E. 
Gleaves, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and 
appellants. 
Harold E. Kennedy, County Counsel, 
Lloyd S. Davis, Deputy County Counsel, 
E. D. Yeomans, Walt A. Steiger and James 
w. Obrien, Los Angeles, for defendants 
and respondents. 
TOBRINER, Justice. 
This case involves a claim of inverse 
condemnation for damages to plaintiffs' 
property resulting from a cul-de-sac. AI· 
though plaintiffs' property lies in an unin-
corporated, rather than incorporated, area, 
we explain why we have concluded that the 
principle of substantial impairment of ac· 
cess, as expressed in Breidert v. Southern 
Pac. Co. (1964), 39 Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 
719, which there applies to an incorporated 
area, is equally applicable here. 
Plaintiffs are the owners of one-half of 
a quarter section of land in the small rural 
community of Vincent, an unincorporated 
area of Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs' 
property is bordered on the west by Sierra 
Highway and on the east by the right-of-
way of the Southern Pacific Ranroad~ 
Sierra Highway and the railroad right-of-
way run in a general northerly-southerly 
direction and are approximately 600 feet 
apart. Angeles Forest Highway, a county 
road, has its westerly terminus at Sierra 
Highway in the Town of Vincent, where it 
intersects, but does not cross, Sierra High-
way. From here Angeles Forest runs in a 
southeast direction, through -plaintiffs' land 
and across the railroad right-of-way, to 
Angeles Crest Highway, -the most direct 
route from Vincent to the general system 
of public streets in, the Pasadena-Los Ange-
les area. The record does not disclose the 
use to which plaintiffs have put their land. 
In 1959 the county board of supervisors 
entered into an agreement with the de-
fendant railroad for the construction of a 
grade crossing some distance from the 
existing crossing at Angeles Forest High-
way and for the closing of the Angeles 
Forest crossing. In the same year the 
Public Utilities Commission approved the 
closing, and in 1961 defendants permanently 
closed the crossing by placing barricades 
along both sides of the railroad right-of-way 
at Angeles Forest Highway. 
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Plaintiffs allege that the dosing has de-
stroyed all access from their property over 
Angeles Forest Highway, and that the 
closing has placed plaintiffs' property in a 
cuI-de-sac. In the present action' plaintiffs 
claim damages in inverse condemnation 
for the taking or damaging of their right of 
access in Angeles Forest Highway. Plain-
tiffs' claim is based upon Article I, section 
14 of the California Constitution, provid-
ing that "[pJrivate property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without 
just compensation. * * * " The trial 
court sustained defendants' general demur-
rer to plaintiffs' amended 'complaint j it 
entered judgments of dismissal as to both 
defendants. Plaintiffs appeal these judg-
ments. 
Thus w~ deal with claimed damage re-
sulting from the creation of a cuI-dc-sac; 
the principle expressed in Breidert v. South-
ern Pac. Co. (1964). 39 Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 
P.2d 719, as to such a situation must apply. 
Although defendants argue that "the cul-de-
sac rule cannot properly be applied to a 
rural highway," any distinction between un-
incorporated rural areas and incorporated 
city areas would be purely formal. 
[1] To grant recovery to owners of 
property in an incorporated area and to 
deny it to those in an unincorporated area 
would _ be to draw an indefensible division. 
No reasonable or functional line distin-
guishes such property holdef:'s. The unin-
corporated area often becomes the in-
corporated area; the sprawling growth of 
city and subdivision necessarily blurs any 
such classification. Indeed, the cases recog-
nize that the owners of land in unincor-
porated areas possess property rights identi-
cal to those of urban landowners. (See 
People ex rei. Dept. of Public Works v. 
Lipari (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 485, 489. 28 
CaI.Rptr.808; Leverone v. Weakley (1909) 
155 Cal. 395, 402, 101 P.304; AnderSon v. 
State of California (1943) 61 Cal.App2d 
140, 141. 143, 142 P.2d 88; see also Rose v. 
State of California (1942) 19 Cal2d 713. 
730, 123 P.2d 505.) 
In Tift County v. Smith (Ga.App.I962) 
107 Ga.App. 140, 129 S.E.2d 172 (reversed 
on other grounds (Ga.I963) 219 Ga. 68, 131 
S.E.2d 527). the Georgia Court of Appeals 
held, on facts substantially identical to those 
of the instant case. that rural property 
owners had the "same rights in abutting 
streets as did city propcrty owners, and that 
plaintiff was entitled to compensation for 
loss of access. The court stated that 
U[t]he defendant seeks to draw a distinc-
tion between rural property and urban prop-
erty when, while the value per front foot 
may vary, there is no distinction between 
the rights of the owners of such property. 
The provisions of the Constitution that 
the protection of person and property shall 
he impartial and complete [citations], and 
that private property shall not be taken or 
damaged without just compensation being 
first paid [citations], do not allow one ru~.e 
for urban property owners and another for 
the owners of rural property." (Id. at p. 
174:) 
Defendants rely upon dicta in two older 
cases which we disapprove. In Levee Dist. 
No.9 v. Farmer (1894) 101 Cal. 178, 35,P. 
569. and Swift v. Board of Suprs. (1911) 
16 Cal.App. 72, 116 P. 317, the respective 
plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought injunctive 
relief against county boards in order to 
prevent proposed abandonment. of county 
roads. Holding that the involved board 
possessed the power to order such aban-
donment, each of these courts included in 
its opinion dicta to the effect that an 
abutting owner cannot recover damages for 
loss of access to a county, as distinguished 
from. a city thoroughfare. Metzger v. Bose 
(1960) 183 CatApp.2d 13, 6 Cal.Rptr. 337, 
relies upon the same proposition. As we 
have stated, we do 'not agree, and to that 
ext~ :we disapprove of those -cases. 
:i'l ,;':. 
, ~2i The test, established in Breider!, as 
appF~a:ble here, requires that we determine 
whether plaintiffs have alleged a substan-
tial impairment of access to the general 
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system pf public streets or highways. Al-
though in Breidert we were concerned 
solely with an incorporated urban area and 
thus held plaintiffs' right of access ran to 
the general system of public streets, we arc 
here involved with an unincorporated area 
and therefore hold plaintiffs' right of access 
extends to both the general system of public 
streets and public highways. 
[3] Plaintiffs' first amended complaint, 
under this test, does not sufficiently allege 
the necessary showing. As we noted in 
Breidert the decisions have explained that 
the court must determine whether the prop-
erty owner has made a showing of substan-
tial impairment of access; the bare allega-
tion of a cuI-dc-sac does not suffice. Plain-
tiffs here have failed to specify the use to 
which plaintiffs have put their property; the 
added distance, if any, which they must 
travel in order to reach the general system 
of public streets or public highways; the 
lack of availability of reasonat:c alternative 
routes to such general system of public 
streets or public highways; or, indeed, 
whether the closing has substantially im· 
paired plaintiffs' right of access to such 
public streets or public highways. 
In light of our ruling in Breidert, we 
believe, however, that plaintiffs should be 
granted a further opportunity to amend 
their complaint, if they can do so, to state a 
caUSe of action for such substantial impair-
ment of access. 
The judgments are reversed. 
GIBSON, C. J., and SCHAUER, Mc-
COMB, PETERS and PEEK, JJ., concur. 
TRAYNOR, Justice (concurring). 
Although I adhere to the views set forth 
in my dissenting opinion in Bacich v. 
Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 366-380, 
144 P2d 818, that case is the law of this 
state until it is overruled. I therefore 
concur in the judgment herein under the 
compulsion of the Bacich case. 
39 CalRptr. 012 
In r. Arthur Chari •• GRADY 
on Habeas Corpus. 
Cr. 7816. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Aug. 24. 1964. 
Petitioner, who was confined in the 
California Men's Colony at Los Padres 
after being convicted in the Superior Court, 
Riverside County, Merrill Brown, J., of un· 
lawful possession of peyote, brought a habe-
as corpus proceeding. The Supreme Court, 
Tobriner, J., held that it is a defense to a 
prosecution for unlawful possession of 
peyote that the peyote was being used in 
connection with the bona fide practice of a 
religious belief. 
Writ granted, and petitioner remanded 
for trial. 
Poisons ~ 
It is defense to prosecution for posses-
sion of peyote that peyote was being used in 
connection with bona fide practice of re-
ligious belief. West's Ann.Health & Safety 
Code, § 11500. 
Arthur Charles Grady, in pro. per., and 
Rufus W. Johnson, Anaheim, under ap-
pointment by the Supreme Court, for ·peti· 
tioner. 
Mitchel J. Exer, Beverly Hi!ls, A. L. 
Wirin and Fred Okrand, Los Angeles, 
amici curiae on behalf of petitioner. 
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen.) William E. 
James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jack K. 
Weber, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent. 
TOBRINER Justice. 
Petitioner, now confined in the California 
Men's Colony at Los Padres after convic-
tion for unlawful possession of narcotics in 
violation of Health and Safety Code section 
11500, presents in this in propria persona 
